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COURT-MARTIAL JURISDICTION: AN
EXPANSION OF THE LEAST
POSSIBLE POWER
DAVID A. SCHLUETER*
Free countries of the world have tried to restrict militagy tribunals to the narrowest
jurisdiction deemed absolutey essential to maintaining discipline among the troops in
active service. .... I
I. INTRODUCTION
The historical limitation on the jurisdiction of courts-martial,
which is solely criminal in nature,2 has been based in large part upon
concern for overreach of military control, fear of unnecessary depriva-
tion of constitutional protections for service members, and a general lack
of confidence in military justice. The national desire for a fit and disci-
plined armed force has provided a counterweight to these concerns.
The delicate balance between the desire for limited jurisdiction and
the need for an effective national defense is first set by Congress. With a
constitutional mandate to govern the armed forces, 3 Congress has estab-
lished the general boundaries of court-martial jurisdiction in the Uni-
form Code of Military Justice. 4 In turn, the civilian and military courts
have further refined and defined the scope of military jurisdiction.
Combined, the legislative and judicial modifications keep the bounda-
ries, and the balance, in a constant state of flux. This perpetual shift-
ing-at most times almost imperceptible-is not without debate. On
the one hand the proponents of restriction argue that unchecked expan-
sion of court-martial jurisdiction potentially robs service members of
constitutional protections such as indictment by grand jury and trial by
* Former Assistant Professor, Criminal Law Division, The Judge Advocate General's
School. LL.M. University of Virginia, 1981; J.D. Baylor University, 1971; B.A. Texas A&M
University, 1969.
1 Toth v. Quarles, 350 U.S. 11, 22 (1955).
2 UNITED STATES, MANUAL FOR COURTS-MARTIAL 9 8, 126(h)(1) (rev. ed. 1969).
3 Article 1, section 8 of the U.S. Constitution vests Congress with a variety of responsibili-
ties in governing the armed forces. For example, clause (14) requires Congress "[t]o make
Rules for the Government and Regulation of the land and naval Forces."
4 10 U.S.C. §§ 801-940 (Supp. III 1979) [hereinafter cited as UCMJ].
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jury.5 On the other hand, the military is concerned that restrictions on
court-martial jurisdiction severely hamper the authority to insure disci-
pline in a legitimately separate society that feeds on law and order.6 A
related issue here is the concern that too narrow court-martial jurisdic-
tion will create "jurisdictional gaps." Simply put, lack of military juris-
diction over the person or subject matter does not always mean that
federal or state jurisdictions will automatically take up the slack. In the
past several years, spirited debate has resulted in several major changes
in court-martial jurisdiction-both personal and subject matter. This
article examines those developments and their potential impact on the
reach of military jurisdiction. We first address the changes in the mili-
tary's jurisdiction over active duty service members.
II. PERSONAL JURISDICTION
A. A QUESTION OF STATUS
A court-martial has personal jurisdiction not only over persons who
possess the status of service member but also over a wide variety of indi-
viduals who do not fit the traditional definition of soldier or sailor. Con-
gress, in the Uniform Code of Military Justice, has provided for
jurisdiction over service academy students, 7 reservists, 8 retirees, 9 and
persons accompanying the armed forces.' 0 Despite this legislative at-
tempt to cover a wide range of individuals, the courts generally have
limited court-martial jurisdiction to those individuals who actually pos-
sess some form of military status. For example, notwithstanding the stat-
utory extension of jurisdiction, there is no power to try civilians in
peacetime;'1 not yet resolved is the question of whether there is jurisdic-
tion over civilians accompanying the armed forces in time of war. 12
Whether one of these particular groups or classifications of individuals
5 See, e.g., O'Callahan v. Parker, 395 U.S. 258, 262-64 (1969).
6 See generaly Hunt, Tdmming MilitagJurisdiction, An Unrealistic Solution to Reforming Mili-
tagyJustice, 63J. GRIM. L.C. & P.S. 23 (1972). The Supreme Court has repeatedly recognized
the "separateness" of the military justice system and the importance of maintaining disci-
pline. See, e.g., Brown v. Glines, 444 U.S. 348, 354 (1980).
7 UCMJ, art. 2(a)(2), 10 U.S.C. § 802(a)(2). R.O.T.C. students are not subject. See, e.g.,
Allison v. United States, 426 F.2d 1324 (6th Cir. 1970).
8 UCMJ, art. 2(a)(3), 10 U.S.C. § 802(a)(3). Seegenerally Murray, Court-AMartialJurisdiction
Over Reservists, 10 A.F.JAG L. REv. 10 (1968).
9 UCMJ, art. 2(a)(4),(5), 10 U.S.C. § 802(a)(4),(5).
10 UCMJ, art. 2(a)(10),(11), 10 U.S.C. § 802(a)(10)-(11).
11 See, e.g., Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1 (1957); Toth v. Quarles, 350 U.S. 11 (1955). See
generall Everett & Hourcle, Crime Without Punishment-Ex-Sericemen, Civilian Emplees and De-
pendents, 13 A.F. JAG L. REV. 184 (1971); Giovagnoni,jurisdiction: Minus a Un/orm, 14 A.F.
JAG L. REV. 190 (1973).
12 See United States v. Averette, 19 C.M.A. 363, 365, 41 C.M.R. 363, 365 (1970) (civilian
Army contractor's court-martial voided because Vietnam conflict was not a "time of war").
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(reservists, retirees, etc.) is subject to the military jurisdiction is generally
not in question. Instead, litigation has most often centered on alleged
defects in the inception or termination of the "status."
B. INCEPTION OF PERSONAL JURISDICTION: THE ENLISTMENT
In recent years litigation surrounding "involuntary" entrance into
the armed forces has been sparse. Induction is not being currently em-
ployed as a means of entry. Other commonly recognized means, such as
the involuntary activation of reservists, also seems to have fallen into
disuse-in many instances because of regulatory direction1 3 or simply
because of the administrative burdens presented.' 4
The most visible area of personal jurisdiction centers on the enlist-
ment-a voluntary change of status from civilian to service member. In
noting that the enlistment is a contract which effects a change of status,
the Supreme Court of the United States in In re Grimley 5 stated that this
special contract must be entered into voluntarily by one competent to
enlist. For years Grimles progeny in both civilian and military case law
supported court-martial jurisdiction over individuals who may have in-
deed had legitimate claims of a defective contractual change of status.
Several rationales supported military jurisdiction. First, courts were re-
luctant to permit a service member to invoke contractual defects as a
bar to criminal trial. They feared that a service member knowing of the
defect could desert his comrades at will, perhaps in the heat of battle,
arguing that he was not actually in the armed forces.16 Defects could be
remedied in the federal courts-after the court-martial had tried him.
A second rationale rested on the "constructive enlistment," which was,
in effect, an implied contract.' 7 In receiving military pay and benefits
and voluntarily performing military duties, a service member could evi-
dence an intent to change his status notwithstanding the initially defec-
tive formal attempt to change it.
13 See, e.g., Army National Guard and Army Reserve--Service Obligations, Methods of
Fulfillment, Participation Requirements and Enforcement Procedures, Army Reg. 135-91
(C5, 15 May 1980).
14 See generaly Dilloff, Involuntag Activation of Reservists, 63 Ky. L.J. 895 (1975). See also
United States v. Kilbreth, 22 C.M.A. 390, 47 C.M.R. 327 (1973).
15 137 U.S. 147 (1890). Grimley was overage at the time of enlistment and unsuccessfully
attempted to use his fraud as a bar to court-martial jurisdiction. See Schlueter, The Enlistment
Contract: A Uniform Approach, 77 MIL. L. REv. 1, 10-12 (1977).
16 See, e.g., In re McVey, 23 F. 878, 880 (D. Cal. 1885).
17 United States v.King, 11 C.M.A. 19, 28 C.M.R. 243 (1959). The doctrine has been
relied upon by the federal courts, see, e.g., Barrett v. Looney, 158 F. Supp. 224 (D. Kan. 1957),
af'd, 252 F.2d 588 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 357 U.S. 940 (1958), and by the Comptroller Gen-
eral. See, e.g., 45 Comp. Gen. 218 (1965).
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C. JUDICIAL RESTRICTION OF PERSONAL JURISDICTION
A broad interpretation of personal jurisdiction remained until 1974
when the United States Court of Military Appeals, in three decisions,
severely limited the military's ability to exercise jurisdiction over service
members with defective enlistments. In the first case, United States v.
Catlow,18 the court ruled that a service member enlisting in lieu of an
otherwise inevitable jail sentence had involuntarily entered the armed
forces; his continued protestations once on active duty (in the nature of
repeated A.W.O.L.'s) prevented formation of a constructive enlistment.
And in United States v. Brown, 19 the fraudulent enlistment of a minor was
aided by a recruiter who failed to follow Army regulations. 20 That over-
sight coupled with sluggish reaction by military authorities to discharge
him, according to the court, estopped the government to argue that a
constructive enlistment had been formed after the accused turned seven-
teen. These two cases, far-reaching in their own right, were soon
eclipsed by United States v. Russo,2C*where the court ruled that court-mar-
tial jurisdiction could not be premised upon an enlistment obtained
with recruiter misconduct. In ruling such enlistments to be void ab initio
the court relied upon common law contract principles and the public
policy against enforcing illegal contracts. 22
In the aggregate these three cases drastically reduced the ability of
the armed forces to try service members accused of a multitude of both
military and civilian type offenses. If a service member fraudulently en-
listed with the assistance of a recruiter, the enlistment, under what be-
came loosely referred to as the Russo rule, was void ab initio and could
never ripen into a constructive enlistment under Brown. It also ad-
versely affected thousands of service members who were serving honora-
bly but had defective enlistments; because of the possibility that such
service members could later commit offenses with impunity, many were
administratively discharged whenever recruiter misconduct was discov-
ered. Many others, whose defects went undetected, found themselves
holding a get-out-of-jail free ticket; because the government bears the
burden of establishing jurisdiction, 23 military prosecutors often faced
lapses of time and memory in proving that misconduct by the military
18 23 C.M.A. 142, 48 C.M.R. 758 (1974).
19 23 C.M.A. 162, 48 C.M.R. 778 (1974).
20 The recruiter failed to properly witness completion of the parental consent form. If he
had done so the recruit could not have forged his father's signature. See generally Grayson,
Recent J)eve/oprents in Court-Aartia/Jurisdictio. The Demise of Constntiome Enlistment, 72 MIL. L.
REV. 117, 119-21 (1976).
21 1 M.J. 134 (C.M.A. 1975).
22 Id. at 137.
23 Runkle v. United States, 122 U.S. 543, 556 (1887); United States v. Barrett, I M.J. 74
(C.M.A. 1975).
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recruiter did not occur.24 Ironically, those same hurdles often frustrated
the prosecution of recruiters who had fraudulently enlisted unqualified
recruits. 25 Once free of military jurisdiction, many military offenders
simply avoided prosecution altogether as civilian authorities often lack-
ed the jurisdiction, resources, or the desire to prosecute them. Thus,
Russo had created a jurisdictional gap.
D. CONGRESSIONAL RESPONSE TO RUSSO: JURISDICTION EXPANDED
As might be expected, the reaction to Russo was mixed. The case
did not result in the intended salutary effect of reducing recruiter mis-
conduct 26 and it was perceived by many as an ill-conceived and unreal-
istic bar to trial. Within the next four years the Russo rule was judicially
refined to extend only to intentional or grossly negligent recruiter ac-
tions.2 7 Further, although a recruit may have fraudulently entered the
armed forces, his enlistment was not in and of itself void, but only voida-
ble28 when government officials were unaware of the defect. 29
The controversial enlistment rules were finally aired in the Senate
Armed Services Committee in 1978 during investigation of military
24 See, e.g., United States v. Loop, 4 M.J. 529, 530 (N.C.M.R. 1977), where the court
stated:
This case illustrates a continuing problem in recruiter misconduct cases. We believe
that the recruiter's lack of specific recall, as in this case some two years after the event, is
not unusual and to be expected. A recruiter sees innumerable applicants for enlistment
as a natural consequence of his job. To expect recall in detail of conversations which
take place in routine situations does not comport with reason or experience. The meas-
ure of proof of a negative fact which can be mustered and the expenditure of effort in
money and manpower to controvert an allegation of recruiter misconduct places a par-
ticularly onerous burden on the Government once an issue has been raised by a bald but
detailed assertion of an accused seeking to avoid criminal penalties.
Id. at 530.
25 Cf. United States v. Hightower, 5 M.J. 717 (A.C.M.R. 1978) (recruiter convicted for
misconduct.)
26 In United States v. Russo, 1 M.J. 134 (C.M.A. 1975), the court noted that: "[t]he result
we reach will have the salutary effect of encouraging recruiters to observe applicable recruit-
ing regulations while also assisting the armed forces in their drive to eliminate fraudulent
recruiting practices."
27 United States v. Valadez, 5 MJ. 470,474-75 (C.M.A. 1978). And simple negligence by
a recruiter would not necessarily estop the prosecution to show a constructive enlistment.
United States v. Harrison, 5 M.J. 476, 482 (C.M.A. 1978) (recruiter failed to detect that
recruit was underage).
28 The enlistment could be voided by either the service member (prior to commission of
any offenses) or by the government. See, e.g., United States v. Wagner, 5 M.J. 461, 468-69
(C.M.A. 1978).
29 United States v. Wagner, 5 M.J. 461, 466-68 (C.M.A. 1978); United States v. Lightfoot,
4 M.J. 262, 263 n.3 (C.M.A. 1978). See generaly Schlueter, Wagner, Valadez and Harrisor. A
Definitive Enlistment Trilogy?, ARMY LAw., Jan. 1979, at 4.
This judicial refinement to Russo rested, in part, on the rationale that public policy
would not be served by voiding enlistments where the recruiting officials were in good faith
and based on the information before them, assumed that the enlistee was qualified.
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recruiting problems. The Committee viewed the developing case law
with concern and proposed a statutory change to the jurisdiction provi-
sions of the Uniform Code of Military Justice. In promoting the change,
the Committee intended to overrule Russo and Brown and return to the
simpler two-pronged test first espoused in Grimlqy. Addressing Russo and
related doctrines in its report, it stated:
The Committee strongly believes that these doctrines serve no useful
purpose, and severely undermine discipline and command authority. No
military member who voluntarily enters the service and serves routinely
for a time should be allowed to raise for the first time after committing an
offense defects in his or her enlistment, totally escaping punishment for
offenses as a result. That policy makes a mockery of the military justice
system in the eyes of those who serve in the military services.3 0
These concerns and others were later publicly addressed in hearings
before the Military Personnel Subcommittee of the House Armed Serv-
ices Committee.3 1 That committee also agreed that change was needed
and in November 1979, article 2, UCMJ was amended to include the
following provisions:
(b) The voluntary enlistment of any person who has the capacity to
understand the significance of enlisting in the armed forces shall be valid
for purposes of jurisdiction under subsection (a) of this section and a
change of status from civilian to member of the armed forces shall be effec-
tive upon the taking of the oath of enlistment.
(c) Notwithstanding any other provision of law, a person serving
with an armed force who-
(1) submitted voluntarily to military authority;
(2) met the mental competency and minimum age qualifica-
tions of sections 504 and 505 of this title at the time of voluntary submis-
sion to military authority;
(3) received military pay or allowances; and
(4) performed military duties;
is subject to this chapter until such person's active service has been termi-
nated in accordance with law or regulations promulgated by the Secretary
concerned.3 2
Subsection (b) mirrors the criteria for a valid enlistment laid out in In re
Gdraml and focuses attention on the initial entry into the armed forces.
It was expressly intended to overrule Russo but was not intended to con-
done military recruiter misconduct.33 Subsection (c) reflects the long-
30 S. REP. No. 96-197, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 121 (1979) [hereinafter cited as SENATE
REPORT].
31 Amendments to Articles 2 and 36, Uninn Code ofMiitayJustice: earings on S. 428 Before the
MiliaV Personnel Sukcomn. of the House Comm. on ArmedSerice.r, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979).
32 UCMJ, art. 2(b),(c), 10 U.S.C. § 802(b),(c). The amendment was part of the FY 1980
Defense Authorization Act, Pub. L. No. 96-107, title VIII, § 801(a)(1),(2), 93 Stat. 810 (1979).
That Act also contained amendments to article 36 of the UCMJ which were intended to
clarify the President's authority to promulgate rules of court-martial procedure.
33 SENATE REPORT, supira note 30, at 122.
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recognized doctrine of constructive enlistment and focuses on the subse-
quent conduct of the service member. 34
E. JUDICIAL RESPONSE TO THE AMENDMENTS
The full impact of the statutory expansion of personal jurisdiction
was softened by an almost simultaneous shift by the Court of Military
Appeals. In United States v. Stone,35 decided one month after the congres-
sional overruling of Russo, the court sustained personal jurisdiction over
a disqualified service member who was enlisted with the active assist-
ance of a recruiter. Chief Judge Fletcher in his lead opinion and accom-
panying footnotes noted that the Russo rule applied only to enlistments
where a nonwaivable defect was coupled with intentional recruiter mis-
conduct.3 6 Because the disqualification was waivable37 the enlistment
was not void. Judge Cook, the remaining judge,38 concurred in the re-
sult.39 Neither judge made reference to the actions of Congress. Re-
cently, the Court of Military Appeals again addressed personal
jurisdiction questions raised by allegations of intentional recruiter mis-
conduct. The accused in United States v. Buckingham40 had several infor-
mal adverse juvenile actions pending against him when he enlisted in
the Air Force; his recruiter told him not to note his involvement in those
incidents on his application. The court reiterated that "deliberate viola-
tion of service regulations in and of itself did not void an enlistment
contract for jurisdictional purposes under the Russo decision. '41 Hence,
even assuming the recruiter's actions were intentional, there was no
nonwaivable "significant regulatory impediment to the accused's enlist-
ment."'42 In his concurring opinion, Judge Cook stated that the amend-
ments to article 2, UCMJ controlled disposition of the case:
[T]he primary question is whether that statutory change forecloses appel-
late review of the purported error in the standard of proof utilized by the
trial judge to reach a conclusion that no recruiter misconduct tainted the
34 Id. at 122-23.
35 8 M.J. 140 (C.M.A. 1979).
36 Id. at 141 & n.2.
37 At the time of the accused's enlistment, the pertinent Navy recruiting regulations per-
mitted a waiver of disqualification due to prior use of marijuana. In effect, the Stone decision
shifts focus from the recruiter's actions to the nature of the disqualification. The illegal acts of
the recruiter so strongly condemned in Russo bar jurisdiction only where the defect or disqual-
ification is significant.
38 When Slone was decided, a vacancy existed on the court. See note 45 infra.
39 8 M.J. at 142. Judge Cook had earlier indicated personal dissatisfaction with the Russo
rule. See United States v. Torres, 7 M.J. 102, 105-07 (C.M.A. 1979)(Cook, J., concurring).
40 11 M.J. 184 (C.M.A. 1981).
41 Id. at 186.
42 Id. Here the court could find no evidence that the prior juvenile actions had risen to
the level of a judicial finding or disposition. There was therefore no regulatory disqualifica-
tion. Id.
[Vol. 73
COURT-MARTIAL JURISDICTION
accused's voluntary enlistment. In my opinion, the congressional clarifica-
tion of the public policy incidents of a voluntary enlistment demonstrates
that the Court's view in United States v. Russo of the effect of recruiter mis-
conduct on the enlistment process was impermissibly overbroad. I would,
therefore, apply the new provisions of Article 2 to the accused's case and
hold that no jurisdictional issue exists for review.4 3
Although the foregoing opinion is the only formal judicial recogni-
tion from the Court of Military Appeals of the statutory attempt to
overrule Russo, all three judges now sitting on the court appeared at the
hearings on the amendment:44 Chief Judge Everett 45 and Judge Cook
supported the change; Judge Fletcher did not. He expressed concern
that neutralizing the effect of recruiter misconduct on court-martial ju-
risdiction would perpetuate serious recruiting misconduct.
While the response from the Court of Military Appeals has been
sparse, several opinions from the service Courts of Military Review46
have squarely addressed the effect of the amendments. One panel of the
Army Court of Military Review in United States v. McDonagh47 and United
States v. Boone48 paid particular attention to the argument that the
amendment may be ex post facto with regard to enlistments entered, or
offenses committed, prior to the effective date of the amendments. Juris-
diction was sustained over both of the accused.
However, the Navy-Marine Corps Court of Military Review in an
en bane decision in United States v. Marsh49 ruled the amendments ex post
43 Id. at 187 (footnote omitted).
44 See note 31 supra.
45 At the time of his appearance before the House Armed Services Committee, Chief
Judge Robinson 0. Everett was a professor of law at Duke University and spoke in his capac-
ity as chairman of the A.B.A. Committee on Military law. He was later appointed to the
court as chief judge, filling the vacancy left by the departure of Judge Matthew Perry.
46 When the sentence falls above certain statutory limits, the person who was convicted by
a court-martial may find that his case is automatically appealed to one of the courts of mili-
tary review. See UCMJ art. 66, 10 U.S.C. § 866. Other cases may be referred to these courts
by one of the judge advocates general. The four intermediate appellate courts (Air Force,
Army, Coast Guard, and Navy-Marine Corps) are composed of senior judge advocates who
sit in panels of three. Their jurisdictional powers are set out in UCMJ art. 66, 10 U.S.C.
§ 866. The judges are given fact-finding powers and have the authority to reassess sentences
imposed by the courts-martial. Appeals from the decisions of these intermediate courts are
made to the Court of Military Appeals which is composed of three civilian judges. See UCMJ
art. 67, 10 U.S.C. § 867.
47 10 M.J. 698 (A.C.M.R. 1981).
48 10 M.J. 715 (A.C.M.R. 1981). This decision contains a good discussion of the volunta-
riness of an enlistment entered as an alternative to a possible civilian jail sentence. In the
court's opinion that situation is not per se involuntary. Id. at 720-21. Cf. United States v.
Catlow, 23 C.M.A. 142, 49 C.M.R. 758 (1974) (accused was given choice of joining the Army
for 3 years or spending 5 years in jail).
49 11 M.J. 698 (N.M.C.M.R. 1981). The Navy Judge Advocate General has requested
review by the Court of Military Appeals of this case under UCMJ art. 67(b)(2). 11 M.J. 404
(C.M.A. 1981) (misc. docket).
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facto as to offenses committed prior to the amendments. In reaching
that conclusion the court noted that although the statute itself was silent
regarding retrospective application it was apparently the intent of Con-
gress to apply the amendments retrospectively. And even though Con-
gress simply intended to clarify and reaffirm pre-Russo law, the statutory
change, in the court's opinion, effected a nullification of a "defense" and
would be expostfacto for offenses committed before Congress acted.50 In
a lone dissent Senior Judge Baum stated in part:
I see these amendments as merely restating expressly what had always
been the law. By reaffirming the principles of In re Grimly, 137 U.S. 147
(1890), the United States Congress created no new rules; it simply under-
scored the continuity in the law from Grimlqy to the present. By its action,
the Congress of the United States rejected the pronouncement of United
States v. Russo, 1 MJ 134 (CMA-1975), for what it was, an attempt at judi-
cial legislation beyond the authority of the Court of Military Appeals and
clearly in conflict with the legislative intent of Congress. The military
services suffered the adverse effects of that ill-advised opinion for four
years, with literally thousands of military offenders escaping prosecution
and conviction. To continue this charade for what may be an unlimited
indefinite period, permitting countless past offenders-both absentees and
common law felons-to periodically reappeal [sic) and assert the re-
nounced doctrine of Russo and thereby avoid accountability for criminal
acts is, in my view, unthinkable. 5 1
He concluded by urging the Court of Military Appeals to expressly
overrule Russo if it determined that the amendments to article 2 were ex
post facto .52
F. IMPACT OF THE AMENDMENTS ON PERSONAL JURISDICTION
Do the amendments to article 2 actually expand court-martial ju-
risdiction? In effect, yes. Although they do not broaden the basic cate-
gories of individuals who are subject to military jurisdiction, they do
expand the jurisdictional reach within one category-enlistees. To that
extent, the statutory change permits trial by court-martial over a large
number of individuals who, under Russo, would not have been subject to
military jurisdiction.
Notwithstanding this change, the prosecution must still establish
jurisdiction over the accused by a preponderance of the evidence. 53
Where military status is an underlying element of the offense,5 4 the pros-
ecution must be prepared to show jurisdiction, that is, status, beyond a
50 11 M.J. at 710-11.
51 Id. at 711-12.
52 Id. at 712.
53 See, e.g., United States v. Jessie, 5 M.J. 573, 576 (A.C.M.R.),petition denied, 5 M.J. 300
(C.M.A. 1978).
54 E.g., desertion, which is proscribed by UCMJ, art. 85, 10 U.S.C. § 885.
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reasonable doubt.5 5 The recent legislative changes will, however, re-
move a number of equitable, public policy based hurdles such as the
Russo rule. In that respect, the prosecution's burden may be met, even
though the initial entry was defective, by showing a change of status
through a constructive enlistment.56
The full constitutional breadth of the amendments to article 2 will
be measured by attempts to exercise court-martial jurisdiction over indi-
viduals who are mere interlopers in military service. In theory, a person
masquerading as a service member could meet the criteria of the con-
structive enlistment in article 2(c) without ever going through the for-
mal motion of enlisting.5 7 However, Congress intended that the
amendments would not provide jurisdiction over civilians.58
The amendments do appear to be having the desired effect of re-
ducing the litigation of questionable enlistments to the essential ele-
ments laid out in the new article 2. Because recruiter misconduct is now
a neutral factor in determining personal jurisdiction, attention will focus
on the primary issues of capacity to change one's status and the volunta-
riness of that change.
G. TERMINATION OF PERSONAL JURISDICTION: THE DISCHARGE
Military courts also have given renewed attention to the rules gov-
erning the termination" of jurisdiction over a service member who has
been discharged from active duty. There are some subtle indicators
foretelling expansion of personal jurisdiction in two specific areas: First,
when a discharge is effective and second, circumstances under which
55 United States v. Bailey, 6 M.J. 967, 968 (N.C.M.R. 1979) (en banc).
56 UCMJ, art. 2(c), 10 U.S.C. § 802(c). See United States v. Boone, 10 M.J. 715, 721-22
(A.C.M.R. 1981). The practical application of the amendments is discussed in detail in
Schlueter, Persona/jurisdiction Under Article 2, UCMJ Whither Russo, Catlow and Brown?, ARMY
LAW., Dec. 1979, at 3.
57 There is support for this argument in the SENATE REPORT, .Supra note 30, at 122-23:
[Subsection (c)] is intended only to reach those persons whose intent it is to perform as
members of the active armed forces and who met the four statutory requirements. It
thus overrules such cases as United States v. King, 11 U.S.C.M.A. 19, 28 C.M.R. 243
(1959). An individual comes within new subsection (c) whenever he meets the requisite
four-part test regardless of other regulatory or statutory disqualification.
The accused in King, after receiving an adverse administrative discharge donned his uniform,
forged orders, and served several months before his masquerade was discovered. His court-
martial for various offenses was voided by the Court of Military Appeals, which held that the
accused had not formally attempted to enlist. 11 C.M.A. at 26, 28 C.M.R. at 250. There was
therefore no court-martial jurisdiction over an interloper. Congress apparently intended to
change that result without extending the jurisdictional reach to include civilians. See note 58
infra. Apparently, Congress felt that a clear line could be drawn where the "interloper" man-
ifested every intent to act and to be treated as a service member. At that point, the individual
was no longer a "civilian" for purposes of military discipline and would be subject to military
jurisdiction.
58 SENATE REPORT, suira note 30, at 122.
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jurisdiction may be exercised over a service member for offenses commit-
ted during a prior enlistment. 59
As a general rule a discharge terminates personal jurisdiction.
Mere expiration of the term of the enlistment does not.60 For example,
ongoing criminal investigations will justify involuntary continuation of
the individual's status as a member of the armed forces.6 ' In any case,
the individual may consent to a continued military status. 62 To mini-
mize confusion and provide a clear rule, the Court of Military Appeals
held in United States v. Scott 63 that a discharge is effective, for purposes of
jurisdiction, when it is actually delivered. Notwithstanding this rule, the
regulations of the armed forces may provide that the discharge is not
effective until midnight of the day the discharge is delivered. 64
Recently, however, the Air Force Court of Military Review indi-
cated in dicta in United States v. Barbeau65 that a change in the statutory
provision governing issuance of discharges66 mandated that the effective
time of the discharge was that time stated in the regulations.67 This
interpretation would, in many cases, expand personal jurisdiction by a
matter of hours. In some instances that could be crucial where, for ex-
ample, the service member has received his discharge and then shortly
thereafter commits an offense or the government learns for the first time
59 United States v. Justice, 2 M.J. 344 (A.F.C.M.R. 1976), aJ'd on rehearing, 2 M.J. 623
(A.F.C.M.R. 1977). See generally Zeigler, The Termination ofJurisdiction Over the Person and the
Ofense, 10 MIL. L. REv. 139 (1960).
60 United States v. Hutchins, 4 M.J. 190, 191 (C.M.A. 1978).
61 See, e.g., United States v. Beard, 7 M.J. 452, 453 (C.M.A. 1979); United States v. Whee-
ley, 6 M.J. 220, 222 (C.M.A. 1979).
62 United States v. Bowman, 9 M.J. 676 (A.C.M.R. 1980), ajdme ., 9 MJ. 397 (1980)
(consented to continued status while German investigation pending); United States v.
Hadick, 18 C.M.A. 533, 40 C.M.R. 245 (1969) (medical treatment).
63 11 C.M.A. 646, 29 C.M.R. 462 (1960).
64 See, e.g., Personnel Separation-Enlisted Personnel, Army Reg. 635-200, 2-12 (C3,
1980). Cf. United States v. Smith, 4 M.J. 265 (C.M.A. 1978) (reservist's tour of active duty
ended at midnight of the effective date with self-executing orders).
65 9 M.J. 569 (A.F.C.M.R. 1980), petition denied, 9 M.J. 277 (C.M.A. 1980).
66 10 U.S.C. § 8811 (1956) provided:
(a) A discharge certiftate shall be given to each lawfully inducted or enlisted member of the Air Force
upon his discharge. (b) No enlisted member of the Air Force may be discharged before
his term of service expires, except-(1) as prescribed by the Secretary of the Air Force;
(2) by sentence of a general or special court-martial; or (3) as otherwise provided by law.
Id. [emphasis added].
This was later replaced by 10 U.S.C. § 1169 (1976) which provides: "No regular enlisted
member of an armed force may be discharged before his term of service expires, except-(1)
as prescribed by the Secretary concerned; (2) by sentence of a general or special court martial
[sic]; or (3) as otherwise provided by law." Id. Because the statutory language referring to
"delivery" of the discharge was removed, the Air Force Court concluded that the support for
the rule in Scott no longer existed. 9 M.J. at 574.
67 9 M.J. at 524. Air Force Manual 39-12, paragraph 1-13c, specified that the effective
time of the discharge was 2400 hours (midnight) on the date of the discharge.
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that the service member committed an offense before his discharge. To
date, the judicial momentum has not swung in favor of the dicta
presented in Barbeau, but it is safe to conclude that many military lead-
ers and members of Congress would endorse its adoption as a modifica-
tion of Scott. Because the military is administratively responsible for
service members until their discharge is effective, it seems fair to expect
that they could be held accountable for their misdeeds during that same
period.68
The second area of potential expansion centers on the military's
authority to try an individual, on active duty, for offenses committed
prior to discharge from an earlier enlistment. As noted earlier, the gen-
eral rule is that a discharge terminates jurisdiction. 69 But Congress has
provided that certain classes of individuals will continue to be subject to
court-martial notwithstanding their discharge. For example, as noted
earlier, military retirees may be court-martialed. 70 Nor will a discharge
bar personal jurisdiction over individuals who fall within the provisions
of article 3(a), UCMJ, which states:
Subject to [statutes of limitation], no person charged with having commit-
ted, while in a status in which he was subject to this chapter, an offense
against this chapter, punishable by confinement for five years or more and
for which the person cannot be tried in the courts of the United States or
of a State, a Territory, or the District of Columbia, may be relieved from
amenability to trial by court-martial by reason of the termination of that
status.7
1
This provision is unconstitutional insofar as it purports to provide juris-
diction over civilians, 72 but it has been repeatedly sustained as to service
members on active duty at the time of trial. 73
Following years of debate over whether article 3(a) was called into
question even where there was no actual break in military status (for
instance where the service member reenlisted immediately following his
discharge) the Court of Military Appeals laid out a straightforward rule.
68 A related issue was apparently raised in the hearings on the amendments to article 2 of
the UCMJ. Note that even where the military has determined to administratively discharge
a service member, he will remain subject to the UCMJ until his service has been terminated
in accordance with applicable regulations. See note 32 & accompanying text supra.
69 See text accompanying note 60 supra.
70 UCMJ, art. 2(a)(4),(5), 10 U.S.C. § 802(a)(4),(5). Seegenerallv United States v. Hooper,
9 C.M.A. 637, 26 C.M.R. 417 (1958). As a practical matter, exercise of court-martial jurisdic-
tion over retirees is rare. As a matter of policy the Army will not try retired personnel unless
extraordinary circumstances link them with the military establishment or they are involved in
conduct inimical to the nation's welfare. JAGJ 1956/4914 (June 20, 1956); 7 DIG.OPS.JAG
§ 45.8 at 108-09 (1957-58).
71 10 U.S.C. § 803(a).
72 Se Toth v. Quarles, 350 U.S. 11 (1955).
73 See, e.g., United States v. Gladue, 4 MJ. 1, 3 (C.M.A. 1977).
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In United States v. Ginyard, 74 the court stated that a discharge, no matter
what the circumstances or purpose, precluded jurisdiction over all of-
fenses not saved by article 3(a).
This simple rule has often been criticized as an unjustified grant of
immunity to service members who reenlisted prior to discovery of their
offenses. 75 Simply reenlisting and receiving a discharge for the prior pe-
riod of military service effectively saves an individual from prosecution
of all but serious military offenses, 76 and offenses committed overseas
beyond the reach of federal, state and territorial courts.77 By modifying
the GCnyard rule to exclude from the operation of article 3(a) those dis-
charges given for purely administrative convenience, a court could ex-
pand personal jurisdiction. The Court of Military Appeals is currently
considering that argument in several cases 78 certified to it by the Army's
Judge Advocate General. 79
III. SUBJECT MATTER JURISDICTION
The second area of jurisdictional shift has centered on the scope of
courts-martial subject matter jurisdiction. A variety of offenses are set
out in the punitive articles of the Uniform Code of Military Justice;80
those articles include both military and common law crimes.81 There is
no "automatic" subject matter jurisdiction, however, even where civil-
ian authorities decline to prosecute. The prosecution must be prepared
to show that the offenses charged are "service connected"-a require-
ment first laid out in O'Callahan v. Parker.82
74 16 C.M.A. 512, 516, 37 C.M.R. 132, 136 (1967).
75 See generally Woodru ff, The Rule in Gin)ards Case-Congressional Intent orJudicial Field Ex-
pedient?, 21 A.F.L. REv. 285 (1979).
76 E.g., desertion (with intent to avoid hazardous duty), UCMJ art. 85, 10 U.S.C. 885;
willful disobedience of lawful order of superior officer, UCMJ, art. 90, 10 U.S.C. § 890. The
military's maximum punishments are set out in Chapter 25 of the UNITED STATES, MANUAL
FOR COURTS-MARTIAL (rev. ed. 1969).
77 See, e.g., United States v. Gladue, 4 M.J. 1 (C.M.A. 1977) (overseas heroin offense and
continuing conspiracy were both triable in new period of enlistment).
78 United States v. Clardy, 10 M.J. 121 (C.M.A. 1980) (misc. docket); United States v.
Calhoun, 10 M.J. 188 (C.M.A. 1980) (misc. docket).
79 Under UCMJ, art. 6 7 (b)(2 ), 10 U.S.C. § 867(b)(2), the Judge Advocate General may
send cases to the Court of Military Appeals for further appellate review; it is in effect a gov-
ernment appeal from a decision by the service appellate courts.
80 UCMJ, arts. 77-134, 10 U.S.C. §§ 877-934.
81 Offenses not listed in the UCMJ may be tried under the general, and controversial,
articles 133 and 134, 10 U.S.C. §§ 933, 934.
82 395 U.S. 258 (1969).
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A. THE O'CALLAHAN-RELFORD SERVICE CONNECTION REQUIREMENT
Prior to 1969 jurisdictional issues in courts-martial focused on the
question of the accused's status. In decisions limiting court-martial ju-
risdiction the Supreme Court repeatedly cut back on the authority of
courts-martial to try civilians and discharged service members.8 3 At the
same time it endorsed the view that the military society was a legiti-
mately separate system. Thus, where the military was dealing with its
own problems or personnel the Court traditionally refrained from ques-
tioning the military's jurisdictional reach.
But that changed with the Court's decision in O'Callahan v. Parker.
Citing historical precedent for limiting court-martial jurisdiction over
"civilian" offenses and the ineptness of courts-martial to deal "with the
nice subleties of constitutional law,"8' 4 the Court stated that court-mar-
tial jurisdiction would extend only to offenses which were "service con-
nected."'85 This new and substantial limitation on military jurisdiction
was designed in part to secure for members of the military the constitu-
tional right to indictment by grand jury and trial by jury in those cases
not arising in "the land and naval forces." '86
The O'Callahan rule was refined two years later in Refordv. Comman-
dant,87 where the Court ruled that subject matter jurisdiction existed
over a service member who had been court-martialed for kidnapping
and raping two women on a military reservation. In distinguishing
O'Callahan the Court set out a number of factors to be applied in mea-
suring whether jurisdiction existed.8 8 Missing from the majority's opin-
ion was the concern expressed in O'Callahan that military courts could
not adequately deal with constitutional issues.
The Court was presented with further opportunity to clarify the
83 See notes 11 and 72 & accompanying text supira.
84 395 U.S. at 265.
85 Id. at 272.
86 395 U.S. at 262. The fifth amendment expressly exempts "cases arising in the land or
naval forces, or in the Militia, when in actual service in time of War or public danger" from
its indictment and trial by jury provisions. U.S. CONST. amend. V. See 395 U.S. at 261.
87 401 U.S. 355 (1971). In footnotes to its opinion the Court set out the numerous cases
and scholarly comments generated by O'Callahan.
88 The Court, in an effort to isolate a workable definition of "service connection," listed a
total of 21 factors. The first 12 are the most commonly recognized:
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O'Callahan ruling in Schles'nger v. Councilman ,89 where the accused sought
federal intervention in his court-martial for various off-post drug of-
fenses. The Court declined to enjoin the military proceedings, noting
that the accused had not exhausted his remedies and that the federal
rule barring equitable intervention also applied to military courts.90 In
so ruling, the Court did not directly reach the question of service con-
nection but noted that:
[The issue of service connection] turns in major part on gauging the im-
1. The serviceman's proper absence from the base.
2. The crime's commission away from the base.
3. Its commission at a place not under military control.
4. Its commission within our territorial limits and not in an occupied zone of a
foreign country.
5. Its commission in peacetime and its being unrelated to authority stemming
from the war power.
6. The absence of any connection between the defendant's military duties and the
crime.
7. The victim's not being engaged in the performance of any duty relating to the
military.
8. The presence and availability of a civilian court in which the case can be prose-
cuted.
9. The absence of any flouting of military authority.
10. The absence of any threat to a military post.
11. The absence of any violation of military property.
One might add still another factor implicit in the others:
12. The offense's being among those traditionally prosecuted in civilian courts.
401 U.S. at 362-63. The remaining nine are general considerations in measuring service
connection:
(a) The essential and obvious interest of the military in the security of persons and of
property on the military enclave . . . . (b) The responsibility of the military com-
mander for maintenance of order in his command and his authority to maintain that
order. See Cafeteria & Restaurant Workers Union v. McElroy, 367 U.S. 886
(1961). . . . (c) The impact and adverse effect that a crime committed against a person
or property on a military base, thus violating the base's very security, has upon morale,
discipline, reputation and integrity of the base itself, upon its personnel and upon the
military operation and the military mission. (d) The conviction that Art. I, § 8, cl. 14,
vesting in the Congress the power "To make Rules for the Government and Regulation
of the land and naval Forces," means, in appropriate areas beyond the purely military
offense, more than the mere power to arrest a serviceman offender and turn him over to
the civil authorities. The term "Regulation" itself implies, for those appropriate cases,
the power to try and punish. (e) The distinct possibility that civil courts, particularly
nonfederal courts, will have less than complete interest, concern, and capacity for all the
cases that vindicate the military's disciplinary authority within its own community. ...
(0 The very positive implication in O'Callahan itself, arising from its emphasis on the
absence of service-connected elements there, that the presence of factors such as geo-
graphical and military relationships have important contrary significance. (g) The rec-
ognition in O'Callahan that, historically, a crime against the person of one associated with
the post was subject even to the General Article. . . . (h) The misreading and undue
restriction of O'Callahan if it were interpreted as confining the court-martial to the purely
military offenses that have no counterpart in nonmilitary criminal law. (i) Our inability
appropriately and meaningfully to draw any line between a post's strictly military areas
and its nonmilitary areas, or between a serviceman-defendant's on-duty and off-duty
activities and hours on the post.
401 U.S. at 367-69 (footnote omitted).
89 420 U.S. 738 (1975).
90 Id. at 754-58.
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pact of an offense on military discipline and effectiveness, on determining
whether the military interest in deterring the offense is distinct from and
greater than that of civilian society, and on whether the distinct military
interest can be vindicated adequately in civilian courts. These are matters
of judgment that often will turn on the precise set of facts in which the
offense has occurred. See Relford v. US Diciplina Commandant, 401 U.S.
355 (1971). More importantly, they are matters as to which the expertise of military
courts is singularly relevant, and their judgments indispensable to inform any eventual
review in Art. III courts.91
Thus, the specific boundaries of subject matter jurisdiction were to be
drawn by the military courts-not the Supreme Court.
B. MILITARY APPLICATION OF O'CALLAHAN-RELFORD:
JURISDICTION RESTRICTED
The military courts promptly, but cautiously applied o'callahan and
then relford. From those early decisions emerged several general and eas-
ily applied principles for determining whether service connection ex-
isted. For example, crimes committed on post,92 or off-post offenses
involving a service member as a victim, 93 or offenses involving drugs94
were service connected. Likewise, the O'Callahan rule did not, according
to the military courts, apply to petty offenses95 or offenses committed
overseas.96 The rationale supporting these exceptions to the service con-
nection requirement rested on the proposition that O'Callahan would not
apply to offenses for which there would be no right to indictment by
grand jury or trial by jury.9 7
These principles remained fairly settled until 1976 when the Court
of Military Appeals, in a series of decisions, severely limited subject mat-
91 420 U.S. at 760 (footnote omitted; emphasis added).
92 United States v. Paxiao, 18 C.M.A. 608,40 C.M.R. 320 (1969). This principle is some-
times referred to as the "on-post" exception to O'Callahan. See Cooper, O'Calahan Revisited-
Severing the Service Connection, 76 MIL. L. Rav. 165, 168-71 (1977).
93 United States v. Everson, 19 C.M.A. 70, 41 C.M.R. 70 (1969). See gnera4', Rice,
O'Callahan v. Parker: Court-Mfartiatjurisdiction, "Serice Connection," Confusion, and the Serviceman,
51 MIL. L. REv. 41 (1971); Zillman, Recent Developents-Relford v. Commandant: On-Post
Ofenses and AfilitagyJurisdiction, 52 MIL. L. REv. 169 (1971).
94 United States v. Beeker, 18 C.M.A. 563, 40 C.M.R. 275 (1969) (drug offenses are per se
service connected).
95 United States v. Wentzel, 50 C.M.R. 690 (A.F.C.M.R. 1975) (petty civilian offense);
United States v. Sharkey, 19 C.M.A. 26, 41 C.M.R. 26 (1969) (petty military offense). In
theory, the government could side-step O'Calahan by trying an otherwise major offense at
eithera summary or special court-martial where the jurisdictional limits on confinement are I
month and 6 months respectively. The Court of Military Appeals, however, has rejected that
argument where the special court-martial was authorized to impose a punitive discharge.
United States v. Smith, 9 MJ. 359, 360 n. 1 (C.M.A. 1980).
96 See, e.g., United States v. Keaton, 19 C.M.A. 64,41 C.M.R. 64 (1969); United States v.
Goldman, 18 C.M.A. 516, 40 C.M.R. 228 (1969).
97 See O'Callahan v. Parker, 395 U.S. at 272-73.
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ter jurisdiction. In United States v. Hedlund,98 the court concluded that
the military status of the victim was not determinative and in United
States v. McCarthy,99 the special status of drug offenses was struck down.
According to United States v. Lazzaro, 100 an overseas offense was not nec-
essarily exempt from the O'Callahan requirement; the court noted that
where an offense is also violative of a penal statute with extraterritorial
effect, the prosecution must establish service connection. 101 In other de-
cisions the court noted that service connection would not necessarily ex-
ist where portions of the offense were committed on a military
installation, 10 2 and that offenses completed within feet of the installation
were to be treated as off-post offenses.10 3 Finally, in order to better re-
solve the factual issues surrounding determination of service connection
at the trial and appellate levels, the court in United States v. Alef °4 man-
dated that the Re/ford factors relied upon by the prosecution would have
to be presented as a part of the sworn pleadings. Throughout these
opinions the Court of Military Appeals emphasized an ad hoc applica-
tion of the Re/ford factors 105 and read Schlesinger . Councilman10 6 as a
mandate to abandon any simplistic formulas for determining service
connection.
The highwater mark of these narrow readings of the Supreme
Court's opinions was reached in United States . Conn. 107 There, the ac-
cused, a Military Police lieutenant, openly used drugs in the presence of
his enlisted subordinates at an off-post apartment. Rejecting a variety
98 2 M.J. 11, 14 (C.M.A. 1976).
99 2 MJ. 26, 29 (C.M.A. 1976). See generally Hodgson, Limiting Court-MfarliaIjuridictiov: A
Continuing Process, 20 A.F.L. REV. 256, 281-84 (1978).
100 2 M.J. 76 (C.M.A. 1976) (per curiam) (overseas larceny offense was triable in federal
district court; therefore, showing of service connection was required.). See also United States
v. Black, 1 MJ. 340 (C.M.A. 1976) (overseas exception must be narrowly drawn).
101 2 M.J. at 76. For an excellent discussion of extraterritorial application and its effect on
court-martial jurisdiction, see Horbaly & Mullin, Extrateritoy'alJurisdiction and Its Eect on the
Admnisitration of Afilitag CriminalJustice Overseas, 71 MiL L. REv. 1 (1976). The same result
might occur where an American court sitting overseas has jurisdiction over the service mem-
ber and his offense. For example, in United States v. Tiede, 86 F.R.D. 227 (1979), U.S.
district court judge Stem issued an opinion in his appointed capacity as the United States
Court for Berlin stating that persons tried by that court were entitled to jury trial. Id. at 260.
To date, the Court of Military Appeals has rejected arguments that service members court-
martialed in Berlin are therefore entitled to the benefits of O'Callahan. United States v. Swee-
ney, 10 M.J. 292 (C.M.A. 1981) (order denying petition for review).
102 United States v. Tucker, 1 MJ. 463 (C.M.A. 1976) (per curiam).
103 United States v. Klink, 5 M.J. 404 (C.M.A. 1978) (per curiam) (drug sales occurred
thirty feet off post and on a tract of land literally surrounded by a military installation).
104 3 M.J. 414, 419 (C.M.A. 1977). See generaly Cooper, United States v. Alef. Punishing the
Pleaderfor Sins of Subject MatterJurisdiction, ARMY LAw., Nov. 1977, at 1.
105 See note 88 & accompanying text supra.
106 420 U.S. 738 (1975).
107 6 M.J. 351 (C.M.A. 1979).
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of government arguments, the court declined to find any service connec-
tion. In many respects this decision represented rote application of the
Re/ford factors without careful consideration of the language in Schles-
inger, which would have required the court to address the clearly ad-
verse impact of this officer's criminal behavior on his unit's discipline.
One of the most controversial aspects of the service connection rule has
been its effect on off-post drug offenses. Thus, the combination of an
offense involving off-post use of drugs by an officer obligated not only to
follow the law but also to enforce it, was a hard judicial pill to swallow.
Rightly or wrongly, the Conn decision provided one final stir to the con-
fusion and frustration of military commanders, prosecutors and law en-
forcement personnel.
A series of cases evidencing subtle judicial drift followed Conn.
While continuing to cite an ad hoc approach to Re/ford, the Court of
Military Appeals found service connection in a series of drug cases
where the actual use, transfer, or sale had occurred off post. If the "con-
tract of sale" had commenced on post,108 or if the drug seller knew the
contraband would be used by other service members, 109 service connec-
tion would exist. In other cases the court, in slightly tortured reasoning,
found service connection in larceny offenses "completed" on a military
installation. 10 The court in effect had returned to a simpler approach
to the O'Callahan rule-a result it had sought to avoid some four years
earlier when it had routinely rejected simplistic formulas in determining
service connection.
C. UNITED STATES V. TROTTIER: JURISDICTION EXPANDED
The military's apparent readoption of more simplistic application
of O'Callahan took a giant step forward in United States v. Trottier.III The
accused was court-martialed for various off-post drug offenses. Al-
though the Court of Military Appeals could have relied on earlier deci-
sions and concluded that service connection existed on the grounds that
the accused knew the drugs would be introduced into a military installa-
tion,11 2 the court went much further.'1 3 Chief Judge Everett, writing
the lead opinion, presented a thorough review of the service connection
requirement as it applied to drug offenses, and concluded that the time
108 United States v. Strangstalien, 7 M.J. 225 (C.M.A. 1979); United States v. Hardin, 7
M.J. 399 (C.M.A. 1979).1 09 *United States v. Chambers, 7 M.J. 24 (C.M.A. 1979).
110 United States v. Seivers, 8 M.J. 63 (C.M.A. 1979); United States v. Escobar, 7 M.J. 197
(C.M.A. 1979).
111 9 M.J. 337 (C.M.A. 1980).
112 S ee note 109 & accompanying text supra.
113 The historical appellate background of the Trottier case is set out in Mounts, Caing For
It" The Gavemmnt'r Case in United States v. Trottier, THE REP., Feb. 1981, at 1.
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was ripe for reconsideration of earlier precedents which had rejected the
arguments that jurisdiction be recognized in certain classes of cases:
Accordingly, while the jurisdictional test of service connection may
remain firm, its application must vary to take account of changing condi-
tions in the military society. Indeed, the Supreme Court's enumeration in
Reford of myriad factors and considerations relevant to service connection
seems intended to promote flexible application of the concept, so that
changing conditions can be responded to.'
1 4
Citing congressional and judicial authorities in support of the conclu-
sion that drug abuse among service members is a serious problem, the
court reviewed the adverse effect of drugs on military discipline and con-
cluded that:
when we reflect on the broad scope of the war powers, the realistic manner
in which the Supreme Court has allowed Congress to exercise power over
commerce, and the flexibility which the Supreme Court intended for the
concept of service connection so that, with the aid of experience, there
could be a suitable response to changing conditions that affect the military
society, we come to the conclusion that almost every involvement of service
personnel with the commerce in drugs is "service connected." 115
This does not mean that all drug offenses are per se service connected.
Nonetheless, the court observed in a footnote that only under "unusual"
circumstances would drug abuse not have "a major and direct untoward
impact on the military."'"1 6
It is also important to note that the court in Trottier did not aban-
don its ad hoc application of Re/ford. It did state, however, that the vast
majority of drug offenses will fit within several of the Re/ford criteria.
The court specifically referred to criterion five (relation of war powers
and control of drugs), criterion six (connection between military duties
and drug abuse), criterion eight (negligible interest by civilian prosecu-
tors), and criterion ten (drug abuse as threat to military post). 117 Addi-
tionally, the court found support in favor of the nine additional
donsiderations cited by the court in Re/ford" 18 and concluded:
We are now entirely persuaded that exercising "the least possible
power adequate to the end proposed," it is necessary and proper in today's
world that court-martial jurisdiction over most drug offenses be invoked as
a proper exercise of the war powers. Nothing short of such exercise, we
believe, will permit our nation's war machine to perform its constitutional
duty to fight-and be fully prepared to fight-to protect this country's
national interests. In fact, anything short of such exercise would critically
114 9 M.J. at 345.
115 Id. at 350 (footnote omitted).
116 Id. at 350 n.28. See also United States v. Smith, 9 M.J. 359, 360 (C.M.A. 1980); United
States v. Norman, 9 M.J. 355, 356 (C.M.A. 1980).
117 9 M.J. at 351-52. See note 88 supra.
118 Id. at 352 (footnotes omitted).
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detract from this capability." 9
In short, the Court of Military Appeals examined the delicate and age-
old jurisdictional balance and tipped the scales in favor of a disciplined
armed force.
But did the Court of Military Appeals in Trottier actually expand
court-martial jurisdiction? In the past, the military courts narrowly
construed the Re/ford criteria without full regard for the Schlesinger gui-
dance to guage the impact on military discipline. Now, at least in drug
offenses, the court will be more likely to consider military discipline and
take a flexible approach in applying more of the factors noted in Re/ford.
The service appellate courts have generally tended to favor service juris-
diction over drug offenses. 120 Trottier will simply endorse that trend.121
Although Trottier addressed only the issue of jurisdiction over drug of-
fenses, much of its underpinning is equally applicable to other off-post
offenses. For example, the court will likely consider the reluctance of
civilian jurisdictions to prosecute service members-a factor virtually ig-
nored in the past.122
Whatever effect Trottier may have on easing the military prosecu-
tor's burden of showing subject matter jurisdiction, it is unlikely to lead
to any rigid formulas of determining service connection. Because the
fluid factors of Re/ford remain, there will be difficulty in gauging
whether any set of circumstances will support jurisdiction. One point
seems clear: the military courts, both trial and appellate, will determine
whether the facts presented support subject matter jurisdiction.
IV. CONCLUSION
The current movement toward expansion of court-martial jurisdic-
119 Id.
120 See generaly Cooper, supra note 92, at 175-82.
121 See, e.g., United States v. Brace, 11 M.J. 794 (A.F.C.M.R. 1981) (jurisdiction existed
over off-base use of marijuana at a national park, 275 miles from base, while accused was on
leave). Cf. United States v. Barton, 11 M.J. 621 (C.G.C.M.R. 1981), where the court could
find no substantial evidence in the record to support service connection over simple off-post
possession of marijuana and amphetamines. Ironically, the case was originally tried in 1975
when the per se rule governing drug offenses was still in effect. See note 92 supra.
122 See, e.g., United States v. McCarthy, 2 M.J. 26, 29 (C.M.A. 1976) (per curiam). In
McCarthy the accused was charged with selling three pounds of marijuana to a fellow soldier
just outside the gate of Fort Campbell, Kentucky. Although the court found the military's
interest in prosecuting the case to be overriding of the civilian community's interest, it stated
that a civilian community's hands-off approach was insufficient in itself to trigger subject
matter jurisdiction. Concurring in the result, Judge Cook pointed out that at the time of the
offense, possession of marijuana for personal use was punishable, under Kentucky law, by
confinement in a county jail for not more than 90 days and by a fine not in excess of $250.00.
He further stated that the fact that civilian prosecutors might have less than complete inter-
est, concern and capacity for pursuing violations of controlled substances statutes resulted in a
tendency to foster disregard for similar military prohibitions. 2 M.J. at 30-31.
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tion includes a mixture of both dramatic and subtle changes. In the
aggregate, this recent expansion does not mark a wholesale abandon-
ment of the principles which have for years restricted court-martial ju-
risdiction. For example, the requirement of "status" for personal
jurisdiction is still viable, as is the O'Callahan service connection require-
ment. However, the extent to which Congress and the courts will
stretch these flexible boundaries is not yet clear; we can surmise that the
boundaries will continue to fluctuate and that the debate will continue
on the propriety of those shifts.
It is important to note that the recent expansion of jurisdiction does
not inevitably lead to overreach by the military into civilian affairs.
What these jurisdictional changes do signal is the option of pursuing
military prosecution where an off-post offense impacts directly on the
military community or where a fraudulent enlistee has voluntarily
donned the uniform and accepted the consequences of his change of sta-
tus. Thus, the current state of court-martial jurisdiction seems entirely
consistent with the Supreme Court's interpretation of Congress' consti-
tutional mandate to govern the armed forces.
Identifying the areas of jurisdictional expansion is not as difficult as
isolating the reasons for the changes. Recent changes in the composition
of the Court of Military Appeals, 123 and a favorable national attitude
toward a disciplined armed force have certainly smoothed the paths of
expansion. Underlying the changes, however, is a subtle growth in the
confidence of the military justice. The system which tried Sergeant
O'Callahan in 1956 no longer exists.' 2 4 In many respects the procedural
and substantive rights now available to a service member equal or ex-
ceed those enjoyed by civilian defendants. 125 Simply put, the majority
123 The current chief judge, Robinson 0. Everett, seems to favor broader jurisdictional
powers and has repeatedly expressed trust in the ability of the military justice system to pro-
tect a service member's constitutional rights. See, e.g., Everett, Some Comments on the Civilization
of MilitaqJustice, ARMY LAw., Sept. 1980, at 1.
124 The Uniform Code of Military Justice underwent major revision in the Military Justice
Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-632, 82 Stat. 1335 (1968).
125 See generaly Cook, Courts-Marial The Third System in American Criminal Law , 1978 S. ILL.
U.LJ. 1 (1978); Moyer, Procedural Rights of the Militag Accused- Advantages Over a Civilian Defend-
ant, 22 ME. L. REV. 105 (1970). For example, the military accused is generally entitled to
extremely broad discovery rights, see MOYER, JUSTICE AND THE MILITARY § 2.440; world-
wide production of witnesses, see U.C.MJ. art. 46, 10 U.S.C. § 846; United States v. Daniels,
48 C.M.R. 655 (C.M.A. 1974); military counsel if reasonably available, U.C.M.J., art. 38 (b),
10 U.S.C. § 838(b); United States v. Kelker, 4 M.J. 323 (C.M.A. 1978). At pretrial investiga-
tions, conducted prior to general courts-martial, the accused is present, is represented by
counsel, is permitted to examine the evidence against him, and is permitted to present matters
in defense. U.C.M.J. art. 32, 10 U.S.C. § 832. Interestingly, the Supreme Court in Gosa v.
Mayden, 413 U.S. 665, 681 (1973), recognized that the military's pretrial investigations pro-
vided an accused with more protection than was available in the indictment process.
Military judges (lawyers) preside at courts-martial. U.C.M.J. art. 26, 10 U.S.C. § 826,
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position in O'Callahan, that military courts are inept in dealing with the
subtleties of constitutional law, is now a minority view. The current
majority view toward the administration of military justice-and im-
plicitly, its reasonable jurisdictional reach-is expressed in Justice Pow-
ell's opinion in Schlesinger v. Councilman. 126 Writing for the majority he
stated:
[I]mplicit in the congressional scheme embodied in the Code is the view
that the military court system generally is adequate to and responsibly will
perform its task. We think this congressional judgment must be respected
and that it must be assumed that the military court system will vindicate
servicemen's constitutional rights. 127
It seems, then, that in determining whether court-martial jurisdiction is
restricted to the narrowest limits absolutely essential to maintaining dis-
cipline, congressional action and military judicial interpretations will
carry great weight.
and apply procedural and evidentiary rules similar in many respects to those employed in
federal criminal practice. In 1980, the military adopted almost verbatim the Federal Rules of
Evidence. See 8 MJ. XLVII. See generally S. SALTZBUR, L. SCHINASI & D. SCHLUETER,
MILITARY RuLEs OF EVIDENCE MANUAL (1981).
126 420 U.S. 738 (1975).
127 Id. at 758. However, in dissent, Justice Brennan noted that "[i]t is virtually hornbook
law that 'courts-martial as an institution are singularly inept in dealing with the nice subtle-
ties of constitutional law."' Id. at 765.
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